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necessary? 
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Abstract 
The unique dangers raised by the possibility of nuclear warfare have long 
prompted intensive debates about what political action is needed to avoid it. 
While most scholars contend that it is possible to prevent a nuclear war without 
fundamental political change, others argue that a substantial solution to the 
problem demands the abolition of the existing interstate system. Two such 
‘radical’ positions are the ‘Weberian’ school, which insists that an authoritative 
world state is necessary, and Daniel Deudney’s alternative, a liberal order 
based upon republican traditions of mutual restraint, internal power balancing 
and powerful arms control institutions. In this essay, I argue, using both 
historical and theoretical analyses, that the regime Deudney envisions would 
amount to the establishment of a Pax Americana. This would be rejected by 
illiberal nuclear powers and therefore fail to solve the nuclear problem. 
Keywords 
Arms control, nuclear revolution, Pax Americana, unipolarity, world state 
 
What political action is necessary to prevent nuclear war? This question, debated even 
before the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cuts to the heart of thinking about 
international politics (Boyer, 1985). Does the avoidance of a possibly omnicidal 
nuclear conflagration necessitate radical political change, or can it be reliably prevented 
by reform within the existing international system? 
The dilemma facing scholars who contend with this problem is plain. At present, we 
face two incontestable realities: the continued possession of thermonuclear weapons 
systems by several sovereign states and an anarchical international order in which there 
is no authority capable of preventing these states from using them. The combination of 
anarchy and arsenals portends an eventual nuclear war, if one accepts the standard 
definition of anarchy as precisely a condition in which major war is possible 
(Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1959). It is a dilemma because the threat posed by this 
combination would logically seem to require transformative change if we are to avert a 
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war that could exterminate humanity; yet, transformative change would, presumably, 
unravel an international order kept unusually stable at least in part because most of its 
major powers possess nuclear weapons systems. In other words, the kind of action 
necessary to rid ourselves of the danger of nuclear war threatens to increase the 
chances of it happening (Jervis, 1989; Van Benthem van der Bergh, 2012). We ride the 
back of a nuclear tiger. 
In this essay, I introduce reformist and radical attempts to deal with the nuclear 
dilemma and then focus upon the debate between two radical solutions: a ‘Weberian’ 
world state and Daniel Deudney’s republican alternative. I show that historical 
evidence from the Cold War bolsters the claim that only a Weberian state can 
adequately solve the problem, and that Deudney’s alternative today, in the post-Cold 
War world, would be rejected by illiberal nuclear powers for the same reasons they did 
during the Cold War – because it would amount to a Pax Americana. Only an 
authoritative world government can assure all states that the nuclear dilemma is solved 
for good, but they will not accept such a government if it is effectively dominated by 
one of them. 
Solving the nuclear dilemma 
Scholars have long tried to develop political solutions to the unique problem of nuclear 
war. We may categorise them as either reformist or radical. 
Reformist 
We can identify four general approaches to the nuclear dilemma which seek to solve it 
short of radical transformation. The first basically reflects the official policies of the 
major nuclear states and mainstream international organisations designed to reduce the 
threat of nuclear war. This approach, largely unchanged since the Cold War, seeks to 
maintain stable forms of nuclear deterrence among the major nuclear powers, a process 
facilitated by moderate arms control measures, the eschewing of offensive weapons 
arsenals, strategies and missile defence systems, and cooperative and sustained efforts 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states (Debs and Monteiro, 
2016). This approach is based upon the assumption that deterrence worked during the 
Cold War and can continue to do so today, but only, or at least ideally, in a stable 
international order (Harrington, 2016; Monteiro, 2014; Monteiro and Paci, 2017; 
Pelopidas, 2016; Walker, 2007). In other words, this first solution effectively aims at a 
freezing of nuclear international politics in its present form, with existing nuclear states 
maintaining their arsenals (despite rhetoric about disarmament) and preventing other 
ones from obtaining the bomb. In this sense, it is the most conservative means of 
dealing with the nuclear dilemma: the greatest danger is any kind of transformative 
change. 
The second reformist solution declines as well to advocate radical transformation of 
the existing international order, but argues that the danger of nuclear war can be 
substantially reduced, or even eliminated, if states and peoples come to reject the utility 
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of nuclear weaponry and deterrence, and, correspondingly, to regard the use of nuclear 
weapons as both abhorrent and ridiculous, as something absurd to even imagine. This 
approach, strongly shaped by the ‘constructivist’ school of international relations (IR) 
theory, contends, rightly, that nuclear weapons are only inanimate things and need 
never be used if political leaders refuse to do so; moreover, the condition of anarchy is 
only a construct of human thought and need not inexorably produce major war. 
International cooperation can increase, interstate conflict can diminish or even 
disappear (as it has among some European states, for example) and the assumption that 
war is an acceptable, much less inevitable, means of settling international differences 
can gradually become obsolete, like assumptions about slavery, simply if people come 
around to that way of thinking (Hymans, 2013; Mueller, 1989, 2010; Paul, 2016; 
Ritchie, 2013; Tannenwald, 2013; Wilson, 2013). Thus, the dilemma can be solved not 
by managing arsenals and anarchy, but by refusing to accept their salience, a process 
which could culminate in their obsolescence, as the recent ‘humanitarian’ initiative to 
ban nuclear weapons stresses (see Sauer, 2017).1[AQ1] [AQ2] 
The third and fourth reformist approaches seek to solve the nuclear dilemma by 
proposing fundamentally new strategies towards nuclear weaponry. As Robert Jervis 
has noted, the third solution deals with the dilemma by denying the salience of the 
nuclear revolution. Nuclear strategists, whether in the late 1950s or (increasingly) 
over the past several years, contend that a nuclear war can be fought and won, and 
that states can and should develop new technologies and war-fighting strategies to try 
to win such a war in the future. While these strategists do not (and for the most part, 
did not) deny that a general nuclear war would be a catastrophe that threatens human 
existence, they argue that limited nuclear wars can be won and, under certain 
circumstances, would be rational to wage (see Kaplan, 1983). Contemporary 
advocates of this view stress, in particular, profound innovations in battlefield 
weaponry, counterforce intelligence, and missile defence systems as evidence that 
the nuclear dilemma can be overcome by technological advancement and strategic 
thinking (Kroenig, 2013; Lieber and Press, 2017; Long and Rittenhouse-Green, 
2015). Indeed, if the United States (there is no other nation to which this argument 
remotely applies, at present) can obtain reliable superiority over all nuclear 
adversaries, it can reduce, if not eliminate, the nuclear dilemma by preponderant 
power rather than management or ideas (Lieber and Press, 2006). This approach fits 
within larger conceptions of US grand strategy aiming at primacy, particularly over 
potential rivals such as China and Russia.[AQ3] 
On the contrary, advocates of the fourth solution argue that the nuclear revolution 
obtains so manifestly that the fear of nuclear war it creates solves the problem in the 
first place. Scholars such as Kenneth Waltz have contended that nuclear deterrence is 
essentially the perfect form of defence, and therefore that a world filled with nuclear-
armed states would never see war. The catastrophic implications of the nuclear 
dilemma are so acute and apparent to all that it should be used to promote peace rather 
than reformed or overcome. Thus, Waltz and others have criticised official policies of 
disarmament and (especially) nonproliferation as both futile and counterproductive: the 
fear of nuclear war is to be welcomed as a force for peace rather than eliminated or 
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ameliorated (Craig, 2003; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1981; Waltz and Sagan, 2010; 
see also Oren, 2009). If the nuclear strategists often favour US primacy, advocates of 
nuclear spread foresee a return of balance-of-power politics and recurrence of 
international rivalries like the Cold War. Ironically, leading scholars in these two latter 
reformist schools tend to self-identify as Realists, even though they advocate 
diametrically opposed policies.[AQ4] [AQ5] 
Radical 
The last two approaches in this introductory overview comprise the radical debate. 
These two schools contend that nuclear weapons are not compatible with interstate 
anarchy, and that therefore – since nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented – it is that 
system which must disappear if the problem of nuclear war is to be reliably solved. 
The first, associated with early nuclear age thinkers such as Albert Einstein and 
Hans Morgenthau, the IR theorist Alexander Wendt, and my own work, can be 
expressed simply: the nuclear dilemma can only be solved in a reliable and permanent 
way by building an authoritative world state (Boyer, 1985; Craig, 2003, 2008, 2015; 
Einstein, 1956; Morgenthau, 1960 [1948], 1961; Wendt, 2003, 2015). This state could 
manifest itself in relatively weak or strong forms, but it would have irreducibly to take 
possession of all nuclear weaponry from existing states and the deploy the necessary 
power to prevent any ‘sub-state’ groups from building such weaponry in the future. In 
other words, it would have to be a Weberian state: it would have to possess a monopoly 
over war-making weaponry. 
I take my definition of a Weberian world state from Alexander Wendt, who 
introduces the concept in his book Social Theory of International Politics and his 2003 
article ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’ (Wendt, 1999, 2003). Wendt sees a Weberian 
state as having four characteristics. It must possess a monopoly of force; that force 
must be regarded as legitimate by the subjects of the state, that is, all the nations of the 
world; it must enjoy sovereignty, the ability to establish and enforce the law over all 
subjects; and it must become an ‘actor’, a corporate entity able to act as a unitary agent. 
This essay will not explore the latter political characteristics of a Weberian state, as 
important as that discussion must become. I am concerned here, rather, only with the 
objective sine qua non of securing a monopoly over war-making weaponry, and the 
acceptance of this by all other actors. My basic claim is that a world government which 
did not possess such a monopoly would be unable to coerce existing states into 
accepting its rule and obeying its laws, paving the way for an eventual conflict between 
the world state and a nuclear power that would lead to a war and/or the collapse of 
effective global government. As Wendt puts it, the ‘key problem’ for any putative 
world government which falls short of the Weberian threshold is ‘unauthorized 
violence by rogue Great Powers’ (Wendt, 2003: 506).[AQ6] 
The alternative to this solution is provided by Daniel Deudney, who has established 
the case that nuclear weapons are incompatible with the existing interstate system at 
authoritative length in his book Bounding Power and several other pieces. Deudney 
develops the argument that the anarchical order must be replaced by a republican 
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negarchical system, one characterised by limited and decentralised government, 
division of powers, and the rejection of a hierarchical world state (Deudney, 1995, 
1999, 2007, 2015). For Deudney, the nuclear dilemma can be solved by an evolution 
towards a diffuse regime of supranational institutions, ones which aim at wholesale 
arms control and the creation of mutually restraining political binds and laws among 
existing states.[AQ7] 
Deudney’s critique of the Weberian model boils down to two overarching points. 
The first, normative, claim is that an authoritative world state, while ostensibly 
providing a more logical solution to the nuclear problem, poses unacceptably dire and 
irremediable risks to human liberty, and indeed human security. The survival of human 
beings, he stresses, is threatened not only by interstate war but also by the predation of 
hierarchical governments (‘death by state’), and the latter threat could become 
unrestrained and inescapable were a Weberian world state to become tyrannical. If the 
core purpose of government is to protect human beings from external danger, then the 
creation of a powerful world state that could kill citizens with impunity does not 
constitute a proper solution to the security problématique (Deudney, 2007). 
His second, more theoretical claim is that the Weberian assumption is obsolete: a 
traditional hierarchical world state built along the lines of a powerful nation state is not 
necessary to eliminate the nuclear dilemma. Because a world government need not 
concern itself with external threats (barring extraterrestial invasion) and therefore 
foreign policy, it can come into being in a qualitatively different form than the ones 
with which we are familiar today. Built without an external security edifice, and indeed 
not designed to consider outward policies at all, such a regime would not resemble the 
modern state, and so could be reliably and systematically deprived of the means to 
threaten human security and liberty. In short, Deudney argues that it is possible, as well 
as necessary, to imagine and build a global order which both effectively eliminates 
nuclear danger and is incapable of attaining repressive state powers: a ‘fully 
nonhierarchical, fully republican, world federal government’, as he put it in Bounding 
Power (Deudney, 2007: 20). 
The rest of this article will argue, employing both historical and theoretical analyses, 
that such a regime cannot work in the nuclear age, because the order he envisions 
would amount to a Pax Americana which illiberal nuclear states can and will reject. 
During the Cold War, important thinkers and officials recognised this; their insights 
still apply today. 
Two historical lessons from the Cold War 
Because nuclear weaponry has existed for 70 years, and the nuclear revolution – the 
advent of megatonne thermonuclear weaponry and intercontinental ballistic missiles 
– took place more than 50 years ago, it is reasonable to ask why we have not seen 
global developments along the lines Deudney has proposed. Although he suggests 
that his vision of a global institutional order derives from the ‘logic of arms control 
politics that have emerged over the decades’ since the early Cold War, the fact 
remains that no powerful supranational arms control organisations emerged during 
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the Cold War (or since its end). Nuclear states are no more constrained by 
institutions now than they were 60 years ago and continue to avoid nuclear use for 
fear of its catastrophic consequences as a result of retaliation by other nuclear states 
rather than because there is a supranational institution that can stop them. Arms 
control remains the province of ameliorative negotiation among large nuclear states 
who have no intention of disarming, and, in the form of the nonproliferation regime, 
preventing other states from joining the club (Craig and Ruzicka, in press; Debs and 
Monteiro, 2016). 
Why have we not seen the development of the institutional nuclear order Deudney 
envisions? This (or any) essay is not the place to answer this question fully. Rather, I 
will discuss two salient historical episodes, both of which show how attempts to 
develop systematic thought or policy about transformation of the international order ran 
up against the structural obstacles Weber identified a century ago. 
Policy: The abortive Acheson–Lilienthal report and Baruch Plan, 1945–
1946 
For roughly 1 year, from mid-1945 to mid-1946, many atomic scientists, intellectuals, 
and some politicians in the West sought to develop a supranational order of atomic 
control.2 Secretary of War Henry Stimson, New Deal executive David Lilienthal, 
diplomat Dean Acheson, atomic scientist Niels Bohr and many others urged (Bohr, 
since 1944) that the United States and its allies lead an initiative to establish an 
international arms control agency which could take possession of all atomic weaponry 
and regulate atomic energy (Boyer, 1985). Reports of the destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki intensified their efforts, and President Truman agreed, in late 1945, to 
commission a State Department report which would lay out a blueprint for such a 
scheme. In January of 1946, the ‘Acheson–Lilienthal’ report was completed (and 
immediately leaked to the press): it proposed a detailed plan for the establishment of 
international agencies of verification and inspection, centralised regulation of atomic 
energy and the gradual transfer of US atomic materials, facilities and ‘know-how’ to 
the just-created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). 
As the report’s authors (and many of its critics) understood, the key obstacle to this 
proposal lay in its reception by the Soviet Union. That nation would have to open up its 
territory to full inspection by (Western) officials, dismantle any ongoing atomic 
production and agree to a permanent regime of verification and further inspection by an 
agency that would naturally be composed of scientists, military figures and 
administrators from the West. Moreover, it would have to do this, while the United 
States still kept its arsenal, and it would have to trust that an international organisation 
dominated by the West would eventually take control over American weaponry and 
remain independent of it (Craig and Radchenko, 2008; Herken, 1988; Sherwin, 1975). 
Stalin, as we now know, would never have agreed to this in a million years (Craig 
and Radchenko, 2008). Yet, even this plan was deemed too risky for the United States 
to pursue, particularly after revelations in late 1945 and early 1946 of Soviet atomic 
espionage, discoveries which had been the subject of absolute secrecy in Washington 
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until a reporter revealed them in a radio address in February 1946 that rocked the 
nation. Even though the United States would certainly have largely controlled the 
UNAEC, supervised international inspection and verification, and kept its bombs until 
the agency’s work was finished, the possibility of Soviet cheating dissuaded Truman, 
and all of his key advisors, from going ahead with the Acheson–Lilienthal report. The 
prospect of ceding the bomb to an international agency, only to discover that the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had successfully built its own bomb on the sly 
(with the help of American spies), was so utterly intolerable to the White House that 
the idea of international control was effectively shelved. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine any American leader deciding otherwise. 
To avoid being held responsible for the failure of atomic control, Truman authorised 
Bernard Baruch, a veteran Democratic party financier, to develop a new plan to submit 
to the United Nations in June 1946. Against the wishes of some of the original report’s 
supporters, Baruch altered the plan, announcing that the United States would not cede 
any material or information to the UNAEC until a thorough regime of inspection and 
verification was complete. Moreover, he declared that any nation discovered to have an 
atomic project would be subject to immediate sanction from the United Nations 
Security Council, whose new remit was to act with force against states deemed to be 
threatening international security. And unlike all other issues, in this case, there was to 
be ‘no veto’ against Security Council action against a suspected violator. Because 
American officials knew that the USSR had commenced an atomic project, and Stalin 
knew that they knew, the United States was effectively communicating to Moscow that 
agreement to the Baruch Plan, as it was now called, would invite Security Council 
action against it in the name of atomic peace which the Soviet Union could not veto. 
The chances of Stalin even considering this, much less accepting it, were zero, which 
allowed the United States to blame Moscow for the failure of atomic control when it 
abstained from the final Security Council vote in late 1946 (Craig and Radchenko, 
2008; Herken, 1988; Messer, 1982). 
Why did both the United States and the Soviet Union end up opposing any kind of 
supranational order to eliminate the possibility of atomic war in 1946? The essential 
reason was that both states were wholly unwilling to even consider relinquishing their 
atomic project without having ironclad guarantees that the other side would also be 
permanently and verifiably disarmed. This was true not only of the United States but 
also the Soviet Union, which did not yet have a bomb or even much of an atomic 
programme. As the US Joint Chiefs of Staff put it, in the atomic age, ‘no system of 
inspection can be expected to be one hundred per cent effective in such a world, and 
ninety-nine percent effectiveness is no guarantee’ (US State Department, 1967: 744). 
The revolutionary nature of atomic weapons (much less thermonuclear missiles) made 
it too risky to rely upon a supranational order which could not guarantee the absolute 
disarmament of all other states. 
Which is to say, neither state, even in the devastating aftermath of the Second World 
War, and even at a time when only one nation possessed only a few rudimentary 
bombs, was willing to accept anything short of an authoritative world government if 
they were to disarm themselves permanently and irretrievably. Not only would a 
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supranational order weaker than that be incapable of preventing a state from building 
weapons surreptitiously, there was also the problem, central to Stalin, of who exactly 
would be in charge of the supranational institutions. In 1945 and 1946, there was one, 
and only one, nation capable of populating an international regime of atomic 
verification and inspection, and of providing the armed forces necessary to invade a 
violator: the United States. For Moscow, a supranational order with the actual power to 
control atomic weaponry could only mean one thing: Pax Americana (Craig and 
Radchenko, 2008). 
Thought: The ‘nuclear one-worldism’ of Hans Morgenthau3 
A second episode in the history of attempts to develop a supranational response to the 
nuclear problem during the Cold War comes in the form of scholarly thought – that of 
the dominant Classical Realist Hans Morgenthau. The advent of the nuclear revolution 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, marked not only by the development of 
thermonuclear bombs and missiles but also Cold War crises in Berlin and Cuba, led 
Morgenthau to conclude that a world state was the only sure means of solving the 
nuclear dilemma. Jettisoning his earlier categorical rejection of world government, and 
indeed his brief flirtation with limited nuclear war strategies, Morgenthau determined 
by 1960 that the spectre of nuclear omnicide necessitated a Weberian world state. The 
threat of nuclear war, he declared, ‘suggests the abolition of international relations 
itself through the merger of all national sovereignties into one world state which would 
have a monopoly of the most destructive instruments of violence’ (Morgenthau, 1961: 
231). However, he failed to pursue this idea in any systematic fashion, instead turning 
his attention during the twilight of his career in the 1960s towards the Vietnam War, of 
which he was one of America’s earliest and most vocal critics. 
Morgenthau had long understood quite well that the solution to the nuclear dilemma 
could not be achieved by piecemeal reform. If the world were to be rid permanently of 
the spectre of nuclear war, nothing short of a world government capable of verifying 
and enforcing total global disarmament would do. Without it, nations would be able to 
cheat, to withhold nuclear weapons secretly, and the fact that everyone knew this was 
possible would stop a more modest initiative in its tracks. ‘Effective over-all 
disarmament’, he told a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
early 1957, ‘is tantamount to the establishment of a world government’ (Morgenthau, 
1962: 142). Why then did he not advocate just that?[AQ8] 
The problem, he perceived, lay in the structure of Cold War politics. Nuclear peace 
could not be had without a serious world government, but such a government could not 
come into being unless the two Cold War superpowers were willing to establish a new 
entity that had more power than either of them did. The situation by the early 1960s 
was particularly tragic: on one hand, the danger of war had now become omnicidal, 
making the creation of a world government an urgent task, on the other hand, the USSR 
was now an established power, with its own massive nuclear arsenal, and so could be 
even less expected to agree to a world government that would be acceptable to the 
United States. There was no other way: a political resolution to the Cold War had to 
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occur before the nuclear dilemma could be solved. In the third edition of Politics 
among Nations, published in 1960, Morgenthau put it like this: 
Competition for armaments reflects, and is an instrument of, competition for power. So long 
as nations advance contradictory claims in the contest for power, they are forced by the very 
logic of the power contest to advance contradictory claims for armaments. Therefore, a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament. 
(Morgenthau, 1960 [1948]: 411) 
The two superpowers could, and should, Morgenthau incessantly argued, reach 
negotiated settlements on outstanding issues, pursue arms control and resume 
diplomatic contacts. They should act more like the European states of the nineteenth 
century. But actual disarmament was a different issue entirely. That would require a 
mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest, and this, he presciently stated in 
1959, 
cannot be settled by the give-and-take of negotiations. It will be settled, after negotiations 
have done their work on the political plane, by the nobler and weightier act of performance. 
Which system will prove capable of meeting basic human aspirations for itself and for 
mankind? (Morgenthau, 1962: 320) 
Morgenthau could not recommend substantial change because the anarchical 
condition of Cold War international politics, which he believed still prevailed, would 
prevent either superpower from disarming completely without being sure that the other 
side was doing the same. In the nuclear age, the only way to be sure that the other side 
was not cheating is to construct a world government, and that could not happen as long 
as the two sides ‘advanced contradictory claims in the contest for power’. The only 
other logical alternatives to waiting for the Cold War to end was for the United States 
to disarm unilaterally and leave the field to the Soviet Union, or, conversely, for the 
West to launch a general war to conquer the USSR and establish a world state by 
might. For Morgenthau, both of these options were so unacceptable that muddling 
through the Cold War was the only possible course of action. 
Deudney suggests that Morgenthau failed to conceive of a world state because he 
was concerned about its tyranny and unable to conceive of a world order which did not 
resemble a nation state. The first claim is not supported by the historical record. He did 
describe a world state as a potential ‘totalitarian monster’, but this was in 1947, well 
before the nuclear revolution altered his views. In 1960, he stated clearly that the 
challenge in developing a world state lay in preventing tyranny: but the whole point 
was that such a state had to be developed in a way that somehow avoided tyranny, a 
point to which we will return in the conclusion. As for the second point, this is correct, 
but that is because Morgenthau believed in the necessity of a Weberian world state. 
These two historical episodes provide a sense of the insurmountable obstacles facing 
those who were sought to imagine some kind of supranational order that could have 
effectively ended nuclear danger during the Cold War (see also Van Munster and 
Sylvest, 2016). In both cases, politicians and scholars alike concluded that such a 
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project was impossible, for basic Weberian reasons, before even worrying about the 
dangers of world state tyranny. There was no way for any Western leader to accept a 
serious regime of supranational arms control which could not guarantee that the USSR 
could not cheat, could not emerge as a ‘rogue state’ in an ostensibly global order; and, 
because even a few nuclear missiles are strategically decisive and easy to hide, there 
was no way to ensure that could not happen without building a world state which 
possessed a monopoly over such weaponry, a reality that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
presciently recognised as early as 1946. Engaged leaders and thinkers such as Bohr, 
Stimson and Morgenthau at least tried to conceive of some kind of new order (on Bohr 
and Stimson, see Craig and Radchenko, 2008; Malloy, 2008; Sherwin, 1975). Most in 
the West, not to mention the USSR, did not even bother, settling for a condition of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) and managed deterrence – our first means of 
solving the nuclear dilemma – after the Cuban crisis of 1962. MAD provided a means 
of reducing nuclear danger without forcing American or Soviet leaders to collaborate 
on a world state or to choose between surrender or a catastrophic war of global 
conquest: or, as it was put in the United States, ‘Red or Dead’. Plans for world 
government got nowhere during the Cold War because neither superpower was willing 
to take the colossal risks of subordinating themselves to a state which they themselves 
could not control, and because, after the traumatic crisis years of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, they found in the condition of MAD an easier way to avoid nuclear 
war.[AQ9] 
The Weberian problem after the Cold War 
The struggle for power among rival states during the Cold War prevented fundamental 
global nuclear reform because there could be no agreement about the political 
orientation of a supranational system, and because the unique nature of nuclear 
weaponry dissuaded states, even the supreme United States after Second World War, 
from placing their trust in a global order which fell short of the Weberian bar. The 
United States would only have pursued supranational atomic control if it was in 
complete control of that regime, a political reality which manifested itself in the Baruch 
Plan of 1946. As that plan specified, the United States would have been responsible for 
verifying that all other states disarmed, enforcing sanctions against violators, while 
retaining its arsenal under effective American control. To put it another way, the 
United States would only have agreed to supranational atomic control if it itself became 
a Weberian world state. 
The core question underlying this debate is whether a new nuclear order can be 
established today, now that the Cold War is over and we live in a world of unipolarity, 
which can avoid this quandary. Can an authentically nonhierarchical regime emerge 
which effectively rids us of the spectre of thermonuclear war? 
Liberal nuclear order in an illiberal world 
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In Bounding Power and other recent writings, Deudney develops two distinct 
conceptions of the global order he foresees. The first is theoretical and materialist. For 
Deudney, external threats to human security come from disequilibria in what he calls 
conditions of ‘violence-interdependence’, when the destructive power of military 
technologies overtake the capacity of states to protect their citizens from it. As he 
shows in the book, throughout history states have consistently increased in size in order 
to contend with the ‘bounding power’ of technologies of destruction, a process 
culminating in the ascent of continental-sized superpowers such as the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of an industrial Second World War which 
overwhelmed ‘European’-sized states. With the advent of the nuclear revolution, even 
continental states are not large enough to survive major warfare, suggesting powerfully 
that a global ‘state’ is necessary to protect its ‘citizens’ from the omnicidal prospect of 
general thermonuclear war (Deudney, 1995, 2007). 
As we have already noted, Deudney goes on to argue that a global state formed to 
cope with the planetary threat created by the nuclear revolution need not take the form 
of the modern nation state, because it would not need an external security policy and so 
could be developed irrespective of any concerns about what he calls the ‘second 
anarchy’, that is, external threats from other states. In Bounding Power, he lays out, 
with great imagination, a series of ideas on how a ‘negarchical’ global government 
might eventuate, one based upon institutional forms of mutual restraint and republican 
political foundations. This move allows him, as we have also seen, to address the 
violence-interdependence nuclear revolution problem without advocating a hierarchical 
world state and the ‘death-by-state’ violence it could engender. These claims fit within 
his human security/materialist theorising seamlessly. 
Deudney’s second conception, which would seem naturally to follow from the first, 
is that the political orientation of the global order he advocates must be liberal. In one 
sense, this is only self-evident: a republican global order would presumably be 
governed according to liberal/republican principles. A liberal regime would be best 
able to accommodate the restraint and decentralisation inherent in negarchy; a liberal 
regime would respect the security and liberty of its citizens, thus avoiding the death-by-
state violence an illiberal regime would threaten. In a paper for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Deudney and John Ikenberry call for a new US grand strategy, ‘Democratic 
Internationalism’, which would seek to use American power to extend these principles. 
They advocate heavy and increasing US involvement in global institutions and 
democracy promotion, aiming, as they say, at the ‘worldwide triumph of the liberal 
vision’ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2012: 10) The order he advocates, therefore, must 
have a political orientation – liberal – and be associated with the power of a liberal 
state – the United States. In making these preferences evident, he departs from his 
materialist argument that a generic security-providing order must emerge to contend 
with a planetary condition of thermonuclear violence-interdependence: the order must 
not only be effective and nonhierarchical but also liberal and American-led. 
Would such a liberal world order be acceptable to all powerful states in our 
contemporary world? Deudney and Ikenberry appear to assume that it would, but their 
article does not address this question substantially. The issue, however, is fundamental. 
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As Stalin perceived in 1946, the question that really matters is not how a world 
government is formally conceived, but who actually runs it. The American plan for 
atomic control purported to be international, but in fact it would have been dominated 
by the United States, and so not actually a world government. Stalin’s rejection of the 
Baruch Plan, similar to his rejection of earlier US proposals (such as the Bretton 
Woods agreement) lay in his correct understanding that accepting such plans would 
mean ceding global supremacy to the United States, whatever the merits of the 
proposals. 
The situation today, end of the Cold War notwithstanding, is identical (see Craig, 
2009; Wohlforth and Brooks, 2007). Who, today, would take the leading role in 
establishing the liberal and nonhierarchical world government he foresees, a task 
requiring monumental resources, power, and political leverage? Of course, this is not 
even a question. The United States, a liberal hyperpower bestriding the world, is the 
only conceivable state which could do this; whether Deudney believes that the United 
States should lead such an effort is less important than the fact that it is the only state 
which could do it (see Ikenberry, 2011).[AQ10] 
In his most recent paper on the subject, Deudney avoids the ideological 
argumentation of his earlier piece with Ikenberry and returns to the notion of a generic 
and powerful arms control regime. He argues that 
If completed, the nuclear arms control project produces an exit from interstate anarchy, but 
does not entail the erection of a world state. Borrowing and expanding the language of regime 
theory, the nuclear arms control project seeks to create a regime of such importance that all 
states, even the most capable, depend on it for their continued security, making such an 
arrangement a complementary regime. A world order with a regime serving such a central 
security function can no longer be said to be anarchical, but is at the same time not a 
hierarchical world state. 
This proposal, however, begs the same questions that were asked by Stalin or 
Morgenthau during the Cold War. First, if the new arms control project is so powerful 
that all states, ‘even the most capable’, depend on it for their security, does this mean 
that these states, including the United States, would give up their nuclear weapons and 
so no longer depend on them for their security? This would seem inescapably to be the 
meaning of Deudney’s suggestion. But would the United States, or Russia, or China, 
take such a step if they were not politically in control of this new regime? Would the 
United States disarm if such a regime were dominated by Russian and Chinese 
officials, and, more important for our purposes, would Deudney support such a 
decision? If the answers to these questions are ‘no’, as they at present certainly would 
be, then how could such a regime eventuate? How does this proposal not simply take 
us back to the Weberian problem? 
Second, if the regime were somehow able to overcome this obstacle, and its 
overriding mandate was to prevent interstate nuclear war, how could it avoid becoming 
hierarchical? As observers of the Baruch Plan discerned 70 years ago, such a regime 
would have, above all, to reliably disarm all existing nuclear powers and to prevent all 
states from surreptitiously acquiring the bomb afterwards. Because nuclear weapons 
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are small and easy to hide, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a ‘rogue’ state 
would presumably constitute a mortal threat to the regime, how could it forestall 
developing the substantial state powers necessary to prevent such a disaster? 
Given Deudney’s earlier demands that a prospective world government be 
nonhierarchical, liberal and able to put a complete end to interstate nuclear anarchy, it 
is transparent that the regime he envisions must be dominated by the United States. The 
United States is the world’s leading liberal state; it alone possesses the tools to prevent 
rogue states from rearming, and, as he argues at length in Bounding Power, America 
also has cultivated a political tradition of an anti-hierarchical, republican diffusion of 
state power, which he calls the ‘Philadelphian system’. 
But, as we have already noted, illiberal states such as Russia and China will not 
subordinate themselves to a regime effectively dominated by the United States, 
however, this regime is designated. For Deudney’s project to succeed, this problem 
must be overcome. How? 
In a pre-nuclear age, the United States could wage a Roman-style campaign of 
global military conquest to impose liberalism worldwide, but – and for reasons which 
Deudney himself spells out precisely in his work – this is a much more formidable task 
today, since China and Russia possess large nuclear arsenals (see Monteiro, 2014). If 
the United States chose not to coerce Russia and China, then it could presumably 
develop an incomplete regime along Deudney’s lines, but this solves nothing. A liberal 
regime dominated by the United States but rejected by other nuclear states would not 
eliminate nuclear danger because ‘rogue’ states would retain their nuclear arsenals, 
thus making a war between them, or between one of them and the liberal regime, still 
possible. Anarchy would continue to obtain. It would therefore not be an effective 
government because it would be unable to compel ‘rogue’ states to obey its laws. China 
could deny its citizenry basic human rights, Russia could invade the Baltic states, and 
the liberal world government would either have to acquiesce or wage war against them. 
Perhaps most significant of all, it would not, and could not, be nonhierarchical. As 
we have pointed out, even an authentically global regime would have to adopt some 
hierarchical powers; in a condition of incomplete nuclear order, it would have to adopt 
intensive ones. For unless the liberal regime wanted to run the risk of nuclear blackmail 
or destruction at the hands of illiberal nuclear powers, it would have to maintain an 
external security policy, retain hierarchical control over its war-making weaponry and 
deploy it against illiberal states. Indeed, liberals like Deudney would be the first to 
demand that the liberal regime remain hierarchical and armed to the teeth, and they 
would be right to do so. World politics would continue on as an anarchical condition in 
which a liberal state is pitted against illiberal ones. Such a scenario is the opposite of 
‘negarchical’ republican order, and indeed is basically what we have today. 
As is evident, the problem for Deudney is the simple existence of powerful illiberal 
states, which may be why they are hardly mentioned in his article with Ikenberry. For 
his nonhierarchical liberal world government to succeed, all major powers must 
become willing to take part in a US-led liberal regime. 
There are two conceivable means of achieving this goal. The first, recalling Francis 
Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, would be to wait for liberalism’s inevitable 
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victory (Fukuyama, 1992). If worldwide liberalism is necessary, then perhaps the West 
should effectively sit back and wait for it to happen. Deudney and Ikenberry (2012) 
hint at such a policy, arguing that the West should rely more on the ‘pull of success’ 
rather than the ‘push of power’ while cultivating alliances and cooperation among 
Democratic states and societies (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2012: 3). This answer would 
be consistent with Deudney’s materialist teleology as well as his anti-militarism. 
It is not consistent, however, with the normative claim that interstate anarchy is 
incompatible with nuclear weaponry and that this problem demands urgent solution. A 
policy of waiting represents the opposite of urgency and does nothing to contend with 
the possibility that Fukuyama was wrong, something that recent political trends in the 
West suggest may well be likely. China and Russia might liberalise, but then again they 
might not, and could well be joined by other illiberal nuclear powers in the meantime. 
Unless Deudney can demonstrate that all illiberal powers are certain to liberalise, and 
soon, he cannot simultaneously demand radical change in the name of nuclear peace 
and an American-led liberal order. 
The second alternative offers a possible way out of that problem. This would be the 
adoption of the third ‘reformist’ solution to the nuclear dilemma: US nuclear primacy. 
Advocates of this approach argue that the United States can use its qualitative lead in 
nuclear technologies, sheer military might and economic power and its present 
preponderant position in the international system, to obtain meaningful superiority over 
all nuclear rivals. By combining offensive nuclear strategies with advanced forms of 
ballistic missile defence, the United States could overcome the nuclear deterrents of 
illiberal states like China and Russia and present them with a new environment in 
which they are invited to join the liberal fold or face the prospect of military defeat. 
Although Deudney might be reluctant to admit it, nuclear primacy is the most 
logical strategy of attaining a US-led global order, as it could speed up the end of 
history and ensure US leadership of the new order that emerged. Moreover, if 
American nuclear coercion were successful, it could eliminate once and for all the 
possibility of a general nuclear war by replacing the current anarchical system with a 
Pax Americana in which only the United States possessed nuclear weaponry. Such an 
approach, of course, runs tremendous risks of nuclear war and portends an era of 
extreme US militarism. It would result in an American world state that would be the 
opposite of nonhierarchical. If nonhierarchy is what Deudney seeks, then he must 
oppose such an alternative, even if it were successful because hierarchy is hierarchy, 
whether it comes in the form of American rule or that of any other regime. On the other 
hand, if the triumph of an American-led regime is his real goal, then it is difficult to see 
why he would oppose nuclear primacy. 
The Weberian imperative 
If we wish to see the creation of a supranational order which reliably and durably 
eliminates the threat of nuclear omnicide, therefore, we cannot accept the position that 
it must be liberal and led by the United States. As Henry Stimson and Niels Bohr 
argued at the end of the Second World War, and Morgenthau a decade later, to create a 
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world government that actually solves the nuclear dilemma means cooperating, and 
compromising, with other great powers. Otherwise, illiberal states will simply refuse to 
be part of it, and an incomplete nuclear order is no order at all. 
I have argued that a world government which does not possess a monopoly over 
war-making weaponry cannot work, and that Deudney’s insistence that such a 
government must be liberal and American-led guarantees that it will not possess such a 
monopoly, barring a rapid end of history or a dangerous season of American nuclear 
primacy. Therefore, if solving the nuclear dilemma is a matter of urgency, it can only 
occur by acts of political compromise among the large nuclear powers, compromise 
driven by the recognition, common to all states, that the continuing status quo of 
interstate anarchy poses an existential threat to all of them and to humanity at large (see 
Schell, 1983). Moreover, the existential nature of the nuclear threat means that a 
compromise to eliminate anarchy cannot take place after a nuclear war: unlike previous 
after-the-deluge covenants, the nuclear threat must be pre-empted, eliminated before it 
happens. The few survivors of a global nuclear war might well see the logic of world 
government, but by then it would be too late. 
A state built upon the objective of eliminating nuclear anarchy would therefore be 
unable to satisfy Deudney’s demands that it must be liberal and nonhierarchical. It 
would only be acceptable to all nuclear states if it guaranteed to all of them, not least 
the United States, that no ‘sub-state’ retained sovereign possession over nuclear 
weapons or had the ability to rebuild them. The United States rejected a global nuclear 
order in 1946 when the USSR barely had an atomic programme, much less the bomb. 
The idea that it would tolerate the possibility of nuclear recalcitrance today is fanciful, 
and presumably Deudney (and I) would be the first to oppose nuclear disarmament by 
the West without ironclad means of ensuring the same by other illiberal states. 
The ‘unipolar moment’ provides an opportunity to create a new world order which 
eliminates the risk of an omnicidal nuclear war, and which can provide other 
supranational goods, on matters such as climate change and migration, that our 
interstate system is categorically incapable of solving. Because these problems threaten 
all states, and humanity at large, the logic for a world state has never been more 
compelling. Deudney’s response that the prospect of inescapable global tyranny makes 
an authoritative world state too dangerous is perfectly justifiable, and I do not for a 
moment dismiss the importance of this concern. Deudney’s quotation of Morgenthau’s 
comment in 1960 provides us precisely with the problématique we must confront. 
‘How, “he asks”, can the atomic power be transferred to the control of supranational 
institutions that will prevent its use on behalf of a particular national interest without 
submerging the autonomous life of individual nations in a universal tyranny?’ 
Morgenthau is not denying that it is imperative to avoid universal tyranny. But he is 
also stating that atomic power must be transferred to a supranational institution which 
can prevent its use. Only a Weberian world state can accomplish the latter task. It is 
better to confront that reality, and think of ways to prevent it from becoming tyrannical, 
than to advocate a third way which cannot work. 
Notes 
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1. I acknowledge that this constructivist solution, however one regards its persuasiveness, 
could also be regarded as radical, insofar as it aims at the obsolescence of anarchy and/or 
abolition of nuclear weaponry. However, it does not seek to replace the current system with 
another kind of political order, which permits the ever-present possibility of a reversion to 
anarchy or reinvention of weaponry, something the constructivist way of thinking cannot 
rule out by definition. In other words, if there is nothing to stop people from choosing to 
disregard anarchy and eschew nuclear weapons as barbaric, there is also nothing to stop 
them from later changing their minds. 
2. Deudney’s (2007) brief discussion of this plan in Bounding Power is not in accord with the 
historical literature. 
3. This section is adapted from Craig, in Van Munster and Sylvest (2016). 
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